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Abstract—Bridges are onion routers in the Tor Network whose
IP addresses are not public. So far, no global security analysis of
Tor bridges has been performed. Leveraging public data sources,
and two known Tor issues, we perform the first systematic study
on the security of the Tor bridges infrastructure. Our study covers
both the public infrastructure available to all Tor users, and the
previously unreported private infrastructure, comprising private
nodes for the exclusive use of those who know their existence.
Our analysis of the public infrastructure is twofold. First,
we examine the security implications of the public data in the
CollecTor service, identifying several pieces of data that may
be detrimental for the security of bridges. Then, we measure
security relevant properties of public bridges. Our results show
that the 55% of public bridges that carry clients are vulnerable to
aggressive blocking; that 90% of bridge clients use default bridges
that are trivial to identify; that the concurrent deployment of
Pluggable Transports in bridges reduces the security of the most
secure transports; and that running non-Tor services in the same
host as a bridge may harm its anonymity.
To study the private infrastructure, we use an approach to
discover 694 private bridges on the Internet and a novel technique
to track bridges across IP changes. We are first to measure the
size of the private bridge population (35% discovered bridges are
private) and to report existence of infrastructures that use private
proxies to forward traffic to backend bridges or relays. We use a
novel clustering approach to analyze the different infrastructures
using proxies and bridges, examining its hosting and security
properties. We provide an extensive discussion on the security
implications of our findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tor Network [35] offers protection against censor-
ship [37], surveillance, and traffic monitoring [12], [23], by us-
ing encryption and hiding communication patterns by routing
traffic through several onion routers (ORs). Tor keeps secret
the IP addresses of a fraction of the entry ORs, called bridges,
so that it is not trivial to block traffic destined to the Tor
Network. To increase protection, bridges deploy Pluggable
Transports (PTs) [30], which disguise Tor traffic so that it
is difficult to recognize through deep packet inspection [7],
[39] or active probing approaches that connect to the bridge
mimicking a Tor user [41], [44].
Research related to Tor bridges has focused on designing
secure PTs [1], [21], [24], [40], [45], and proposing techniques
to discover the IP address of bridges [15], [20]. However,
to date there has been no security analysis of the bridge
infrastructure as a whole. In this work we set out to perform the
first systematic study of the Tor bridge infrastructure from a se-
curity point of view. We study both the infrastructure of public
bridges, i.e., bridges that volunteers provide to be used by any
Tor user, and private bridges, i.e., bridges for the exclusive use
of individuals who know about their existence. While public
bridges are known to the Tor Network, and report configuration
and usage information to bridge authorities, private bridges do
not report such data and thus their population and properties
remain unknown. As far as we know, this is the first work that
reports on Tor’s private bridge infrastructure.
Public Infrastructure Analysis. To study public bridges, we
leverage CollecTor [25], a public Tor service that enables
access to fine-grained longitudinal data reported by public
bridges (among other Tor nodes). The goal of our analysis
of the public infrastructure is twofold. First, we aim at un-
derstanding whether any of the published data can harm the
security of the public bridge infrastructure. We find out that
usage statistics in CollecTor can be used to rank bridges by
importance, e.g., by the number of clients from a specific
country, or the amount of traffic carried for a particularly
strong PT, which in turn allows an adversary to evaluate how
well her blocking works and to identify targets. Furthermore,
we find that the publication of which OR port a bridge uses
to communicate with bridge authorities can be leveraged to
optimize a scan-based search for IP addresses of public bridges
and to select specific ports to scan to find a target bridge.
Our findings, already reported to the Tor project, have lead
CollecTor maintainers to start sanitizing the OR port data [16].
Second, we aim at measuring security-relevant properties of
public bridges. We analyze the population size and its stability,
finding that only 45% of public bridges carry user traffic. These
bridges are long-lived and stable: their median lifetime is 4
months, and they rarely change IP address. While stability
is good to increase bridge usage, it also means an adversary
that discovers a bridge can block it for long periods of time
without side-effects. We also observe that default bridges,
whose IP addresses can be obtained from the Tor Browser
Bundle support over 90% of bridge users, essentially defeating
the very purpose of bridges. This holds in countries where
censorship is known to happen such as Iran or Syria, raising
the issue that a censor can at any point, e.g., in response to
an event like the recent coup in Turkey, disconnect the vast
majority of bridge users in the country. Finally, we analyze
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PT deployment, finding that 77% of public bridges only offer
the easy-to-detect vanilla Tor and another 15% offer PTs with
conflicting security properties (e.g., with and without active
probing protection). The latter enables an adversary to identify
the bridge through the weaker PT and disable the stronger PTs
by blocking the bridge’s IP.
Private Infrastructure Analysis. To study private bridges, not
present in CollecTor or other Tor services, we first leverage
two known Tor issues [4], [38] to find their IP addresses using
Internet-wide scans. This means that our study of the private
infrastructure is opportunistic; fixing the Tor issues we leverage
may prevent future replication of our measurements. Rather
than launching our own scans, which could interfere with the
Tor Network, we show how scan search engines [3], [18] can
be leveraged to launch large-scale discovery of the IP addresses
of bridges, with no investment in scanning infrastructure.
We follow an approach to discover bridges that uses scan
search engines to find candidate IP addresses that may run
an OR; connects to them to confirm their OR role; and uses
CollecTor data to filter out relays and classify discovered
bridges as public or private. Without launching any scan, our
approach discovers 694 private bridges, and deanonymizes the
IP address of 35% of public bridges with clients, and 23%
of all active public bridges, in April 2016. Of all discovered
bridges, 65% are public and 35% are private. We also propose
a novel technique to track known bridges across IP address
changes. This technique leverages additional non-Tor services
(e.g., SSH) running on bridge hosts, and can be used even if
the two Tor issues we leverage are fixed by the Tor project.
In the process of discovering bridges’ IPs, we also uncover
645 private proxies, i.e., private IP addresses that forward
traffic to a backend bridge or relay, and through which users
can also enter the Tor Network. As far as we know, we are first
to report on the existence of such private proxies. An important
security implication is that discovery of a private bridge or
proxy enables an adversary to flag IP addresses connecting to
it as members of the owner organization, or the owner itself,
and to geographically locate them.
We study the infrastructures built using proxies and bridges
using a novel clustering approach to group ORs owned by
the same entity based on their configuration and IP addresses.
We observe 3 prevalent cluster types: (I) a line of 2 up to
178 proxies on nearby IP addresses all forwarding to the same
backend OR; (II) a simplified version, with a single proxy
forwarding to one backend OR; and (III) a set of bridges
with no proxies, where bridges are either all public or all
private. In both Type I and Type II clusters, the backend OR
is typically a public bridge or a relay (but rarely a private
bridge), and in 77% of these clusters the backend is in the
same autonomous system (AS) as the proxies. In other words,
cluster owners seem to contribute a public bridge or relay to the
Tor Network, but use nearby IP addresses to run private proxies
for their exclusive use. However, in general these proxies do
not contribute much IP address diversity as they are hosted in
the same AS and typically in nearby IP addresses. In 93% of
Type III clusters, all bridges are located in the same AS, thus
also raising concerns on lack of IP diversity.
II. OVERVIEW
We now present an overview of the Tor Network, focused
on the components more relevant to our work. Then, in
Section II-B, we describe open issues in Tor that an adversary
can leverage to discover the IPs of hosts running bridges.
A. The Tor Network
The core element of the Tor Network are Onion Routers
(ORs), also known as relays, which are essentially routers that
forward encrypted data. A user that wants to anonymously
access an Internet service runs the Tor software on its client
host. This software builds a circuit of connections over three
ORs, through which traffic is forwarded between the client host
and Internet services. This circuit guarantees that the traffic
is encrypted until it exits the circuit and that none of the
relays knows both the origin and the destination of the traffic.
Some of the ORs act as directory authorities, storing contact
information for all ORs currently part of the Tor Network.
Directory authorities can be queried by clients to find relays
when building circuits.
Each OR is uniquely identified in the Tor Network by its
fingerprint, which is the 20-byte SHA1 hash of its public key.
ORs listen on a dedicated OR port for incoming connections
using the vanilla Tor protocol [2]. The OR port is by default
set to 0 [33], i.e., a freshly installed OR will not accept
connections. To use the OR as a relay or bridge, the owner
needs to explicitly set the OR port in the configuration file to
a particular port, or to auto to choose a random OR port.
Bridges. Since the IP addresses of all Tor relays can be
obtained at any point of time from the directory authorities, the
Tor Network introduced a new OR type called bridge. Bridges
are essentially relays that act always as first hop in a circuit,
and whose IP addresses are not publicly advertised.
Pluggable Transports. An alternative way to prevent access
to the Tor Network is blocking any traffic that looks like Tor
communication, regardless of its destination. This is possible
due to distinguishing features of vanilla Tor that are easy to
detect (detailed in Section II-B). After censors started deploy-
ing deep packet inspection techniques to detect such features,
the Tor Network introduced Pluggable Transports (PTs) [30].
A PT is just a wrapper for the Tor protocol that transforms
the Tor traffic flowing between clients and bridges. Over time
multiple PTs have been proposed and the most recent protocols
include features such as reply protection, which guarantees
that the bridge will allow connections and data transmits, only
from users that previously authenticated. Pluggable Transports
either imitate popular protocols (e.g., fte [5]), encapsulate Tor
traffic using popular protocols like TLS (e.g., meek [8]), or are
designed to look like random streams (e.g., obfs3 [28]). PTs
may also implement reply protection against active probing
(e.g., obfs4 [1], ScrambleSuit [42]), in which case they require
users to know a shared secret before replying. A bridge can
offer multiple PTs, each running on its own PT port.
Bridge Distribution. To use a bridge, Tor clients need to
obtain its endpoint information, i.e., the IP address and port
where the bridge listens for connections. Additionally, the user
may need some extra information (e.g., the secret when using
PTs with reply protection). Since it must not be possible
for an adversary to find out the IP address of all bridges,
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Fig. 1. Bridge distribution workflow: ¶ upon installation the bridge sends its
descriptors with contact information to the Bridge Authority that · assigns the
bridge to BridgeDB; ¸ the user requests a bridge from BridgeDB through an
uncensored channel such as email; ¹ BridgeDB sends the contact information
for the bridge; º the client connects to the bridge using a PT; » and the
bridge builds a circuit through the Tor Network. At this point, ¼ the client
can communicate to the censored service through Tor.
their endpoint information needs to be carefully distributed to
clients. There exist two classes of bridges: public and private.
Public bridges can be used by any Tor client. They upload
their endpoint information to Tor’s Bridge Authority (or bridge
directory authority), which maintains a list of available public
bridges in the Tor Network. Endpoint information for public
bridges is distributed to users by the BridgeDB service, which
periodically receives it from the Bridge Authority. BridgeDB
supports two different distribution channels. Users can visit its
website1 or send it an email request2. In both cases, users can
specify the type of transport they want and whether they need
a bridge that supports IPv6. Figure 1 depicts the distribution
workflow for a public bridge.
The distribution algorithm adopted by BridgeDB aims
at preventing the listing of a significant fraction of public
bridges [17]: it only distributes a few bridges to each re-
questing IP address or email account, it restricts distribution
to a subset of the bridge pool that changes over time, and it
limits email requests to addresses from specific mail providers
(Gmail, Yahoo, RiseUp).
To facilitate the use of bridges without having to go through
the BridgeDB distribution channels, the Tor software ships
with a list of default bridges for different transports. The IP
addresses of these bridges are trivial to obtain, since they
are hardcoded in the Tor Browser Bundle configuration files
– effectively making them relays from the point of view of
an adversary. Thus, these bridges can be easily blocked by
adversaries. When the Tor Project detects blocking on a default
bridge, the bridge is replaced by a new default.
In contrast, private bridges do not share their endpoint
information with the Bridge Authority and thus are opaque
to the Tor Project maintainers. Since they do not upload their
descriptors on the Bridge Authority, they are not advertised
1https://bridges.torproject.org/
2bridges@torproject.org
to users that request a bridge from BridgeDB. Endpoint infor-
mation of private bridges is distributed using private channels
shared between the operator running the private bridges and
the people using them.
B. Known Tor Issues
In this Section we describe two known Tor open issues that
we leverage to discover IP addresses of bridges.
Vanilla Tor Certificates. The vanilla Tor protocol com-
prises two phases. First, the client and the bridge perform
a TLS handshake to agree on a shared key. Then, the two
parties exchange Tor messages encrypted with that shared
key. In principle, using a TLS handshake should make the
vanilla Tor traffic look like TLS. In practice, the certifi-
cate chain sent by the bridge to the client during the TLS
handshake is easily distinguishable, enabling to identify Tor
handshakes among all TLS handshakes. In particular, the
certificate chain contains a single certificate where the sub-
ject and the issuer differ and their common names have
an easy to identify pattern: SubjectCN=www.[random].com;
IssuerCN=www.[random].net, where [random] are base32-
encoded random strings of length between 8 and 20 characters.
While the certificate is changed every 2 hours, this pattern is
always maintained. This issue is known by the Tor Project
since at least October 2012, when a ticket was open to revise
the certificates used by Tor [26]. However, the conclusion was
that efforts to make vanilla Tor indistinguishable from TLS
were superseded by the introduction of Pluggable Transports,
and the issue was left as “wontfix” [26]. This decision should
be ascribed mainly to the choice of not changing code in core
parts of Tor to avoid introducing new bugs and security issues.
Furthermore, developers believed that PTs were deployed
widely enough for being considered the state of the art solution
for users needing to bypass censorship.
Open OR port in Bridges. The second known open issue is
that bridges always have an OR port open that offers vanilla
Tor, even when they do not advertise vanilla Tor as a transport,
but only advertise stronger PTs. Thus, bridges offering PTs will
open one port per PT plus an additional one for the OR port.
This issue is also known since at least November 2012, when
a ticket was open for it [29]. In September 2015, the ticket
priority was increased as it was considered the next major
defense against bridge enumeration. But, it was also stated
that the fix may require up to a month of work, as it requires
changes to the Bridge Authority and BridgeDB, as well as
examining multiple tools that assume bridges have an OR port.
III. PUBLIC DATA SOURCES
We leverage two types of publicly available services as
sources of data for analyzing the security of Tor bridges. On the
one hand we use data published by the Tor project through the
CollecTor service [25], which provides fine-grained configura-
tion information and usage statistics about individual bridges
and relays over time. On the other hand, we use data obtained
from scan search engines, which provide information about
services offered on machines connected to the Internet.
A. CollecTor
CollecTor is a service offered by the Tor Network that peri-
odically collects data from Tor relays, public bridges, and other
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Tor services, and makes it available online [25]. In contrast to
other Tor services that provide aggregated information on the
whole Tor Network (e.g., Tor Metrics [36]), CollecTor provides
information at the finer granularity of individual ORs (bridges
or relays). In this paper we only consider data published since
July 2012, when CollecTor started to include statistics on
Pluggable Transports, until April 30th 2016.
CollecTor currently publishes 16 types of files. Files for
bridges and relays have the same structure, but there are some
differences with respect to the published information [32]. In
particular, to avoid easy identification of bridges, their sensitive
data is sanitized prior to online publication. The sanitiza-
tion process includes the following 5 steps: (i) replacing the
bridge’s fingerprint with its SHA1 hash that we call sanitized
fingerprint, (ii) removing most cryptographic information, (iii)
removing bridge contact information, (iv) removing PT ports,
and (v) replacing the bridge’s IP address with a format-
preserving sanitized version that we call AIP. This AIP is of
the form 10.x.x.x, where x.x.x are the 3 most significant bytes
of the hash SHA256(IP || fingerprint || secret); where “secret”
is a 31-byte random string that changes once per month that
is used to compute the AIP of all bridges during that month.
Next, we describe the 4 files we use in this paper: bridge
server descriptors, network statuses, and extra-info descriptors
for studying public bridges; and network status consensuses
for identifying relays and filter them from our results.
Bridge Server Descriptors. These descriptors are produced by
bridges and sent to the Bridge Authority. CollecTor publishes
a sanitized version containing information such as the bridge’s
nickname (“Unnamed” by default), sanitized fingerprint, OR
port, and AIP. They may also contain contact information
of the bridge operator. Unsanitized bridge server descriptors
can also be obtained from bridges’ themselves (if their IP is
known), by connecting to their OR port. Descriptors obtained
directly from the bridge contain its fingerprint (rather than its
sanitized fingerprint), the real IP address (rather than the AIP),
and the bridge contact information (if provided).
Bridge Network Statuses. These files are produced by the
Bridge Authority and capture which public bridges are avail-
able and their current status, so they can be distributed to
users by BridgeDB. While some of their data is also available
in bridge server descriptors (e.g., nickname, AIP, OR port),
bridge network statuses do not contain the sanitized fingerprint,
but instead include the bridge uptime and the flags it has been
assigned by Tor’s authorities (e.g., Running, High-Bandwidth).
We use bridge network statuses to measure the bridge popula-
tion and its stability. In particular we use the Running flag to
determine if a bridge is active, and thus distributed to users.
This flag is assigned to a bridge if and only if the Bridge
Authority was able to reach the OR port using the vanilla Tor
protocol in the last 45 minutes [32].
Bridge Extra-Info Descriptors. These files are sent to the
Bridge Authority by the bridges approximately once a day
(every 18h by default according to [32]). These files contain
the nickname and sanitized fingerprint, the PTs supported by
the bridge and usage statistics (number of IPv4 and IPv6 con-
nections, number of unique IP addresses that have connected
from a country, and number of unique IP addresses that have
connected using each PT). Statistics are sanitized by rounding
them to the nearest multiple of 8. Still, we can use them to
rank bridges according to different criteria that may be relevant
for an adversary.
Network Status Consensuses. These files contain information
on which relays are available in the Tor Network, their status,
and their endpoint information (IP address and OR port), so
that they can be chosen by clients. We use these consensus
files to differentiate relays from bridges.
B. Scan Search Engines
Scan search engines index data from Internet-wide scans on
a number of target ports. Each port is scanned using a popular
protocol on the port, e.g., TLS on 443/tcp or SSH on 22/tcp.
We use scan search engines to identify IP addresses on the
Internet that serve certificates matching a specific Tor pattern.
We use two different scan search engines, described below.
Shodan [18]. Scans over 200 ports using different protocols
(e.g., TLS, SSH, HTTP, SMTP). When a supported protocol
is identified on an IP, it indexes the service’s text description
(and the server certificate for TLS-based services). Among
the scanned ports, 19 are scanned using a TLS handshake,
which we can use for identifying IP addresses running Tor
bridges (see Section IV-B). Once we identify a bridge, we
query Shodan about data related to other services running in
different ports of the same machine (e.g., SSH, HTTPS), in
order to discover additional bridge IP addresses.
Censys [3]. Scans a smaller number of ports than Shodan
using TLS (only 6) but more regularly, typically on a weekly
basis. Similar to Shodan, for these 6 ports, Censys collects
TLS handshake data, including the server’s certificate, and it
also publishes the raw scan data in addition to allowing queries
on the indexed information. We download the raw data from
Censys and process it locally to identify IP addresses that run
ORs and have their OR port in one of the 6 scanned ports.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION
In this section we describe what properties we measure and
the methodology used to perform those measurements. First,
we introduce the measurements on public bridges performed
using CollecTor data (Section IV-A). Then, we detail the
approach we use to identify private bridges and proxies,
(Section IV-B).
A. Public Bridges Analysis
We use the data provided by CollecTor to measure char-
acteristics of the Tor public bridge population. Beyond under-
standing the demographics of the public bridges, our goal is
to perform an in-depth analysis into how the fine-grained (i.e.,
per-bridge) publicly available data in CollecTor may impact
the security of public bridges. One of the goals is to identify
data that may need to be removed or to be sanitized prior to
its publication. We evaluate the following 5 security-relevant
properties:
(1) Bridge Population. We measure the number of bridges in
the Tor Network in order to understand how large is the attack
surface that an adversary needs to target for enumerating all
bridges.
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(2) Bridge Stability. We measure how stable bridges are in
terms of lifetime and IP address changes in order to understand
the vulnerability of bridges to aggressive blocking policies.
(3) Pluggable Transport Deployment. We measure the de-
ployment of PTs over time in order to understand how long it
takes to deploy a new PT and whether bridges offer multiple
PTs with conflicting security properties.
(4) OR Port Distribution. We measure the frequency with
which bridges use specific OR ports to evaluate how valuable
this information is for an adversary that leverages the issues
explained in II-B for discovering private bridges and proxies
and for deanonymizing the IP address of public bridges.
(5) Bridge Importance. We rank bridges in terms of number
of clients supported for different countries and PTs, showing
that not all bridges are equally important. While some are
rarely used, others represent vital elements in terms of the
number of clients that connect to them, or the PTs they offer.
Beyond improving our understanding of public bridges usage,
we want to raise attention to how useful such rankings could
be for an adversary. For instance, to evaluate how effective
her bridge enumeration is for a given goal (e.g., “are all the
bridges offering a particular transport identified?” or “are the
top bridges for a country identified?”), or to target selected
bridges, e.g., unblocked ones that are hard to identify because
they run stronger PTs (e.g., obfs4, or ScrambleSuit).
To rank bridges, we extract usage statistics from Collec-
Tor’s extra-info descriptors. These are published periodically
as introduced in Section III, which means that rankings could
reflect accurate real-time information and, even though they
are sanitized by rounding to multiples of 8, they still allow to
order bridges in terms of number of clients they serve.
B. Private Bridges and Proxies Analysis
The goal of our analysis is to gain a better understanding
of the characteristics of the private bridge infrastructure in the
Tor Network, e.g., population size, configuration, and hosting.
In particular for private proxies, which are unknown to the Tor
project3, we measure the following properties: the type of OR
backend (i.e., relay, or public / private bridge) they forward
traffic to, their configuration with respect to the backend (e.g.,
line of proxies to one backend, one proxy per backend), the
ASes in which they are located, and whether the proxy ASes
are the same as the backend ASes.
Since private bridges and proxies do not appear in Col-
lecTor, studying them first requires to discover them on the
Internet. We first describe our approach to identify hosts
running private bridges and proxies, and then the clustering
method we use to better understand their infrastructures.
Discovering Private Bridges and Proxies. We use a 5-step
process to discover private bridges and proxies that leverages
the open issues described in Section II-B.
Step 1 – Finding candidate IP addresses. The first step
consists on performing Internet-wide scans on a selected set
of ports, starting a TLS handshake on each IP:port pair, and
collecting the TLS certificate when the handshake succeeds. If
the certificate collected from an IP address matches the pattern
3This fact was confirmed in a private conversation with Tor developers
associated to Tor certificates described in Section II-B, then
it can be concluded that the IP address serving the certificate
corresponds to a Tor OR (or a proxy to a Tor OR). To maximize
the number of bridges identified with a limited scan budget,
we leverage the OR port distribution that can be computed
from CollecTor’s data and focus on the top OR ports.
Since Internet-wide scans can be expensive to perform, and
to avoid disrupting the Tor Network, we choose to substitute
active scanning by queries to the Censys [3] and Shodan [18]
scan search engines. Note that an adversary could similarly
leverage such engines to minimize her scanning investment.
Step 2 – Filtering relays. The previous step produces a
set of IP addresses running ORs (or proxies) at the time of
the scan. Some of these IP addresses could correspond to Tor
relays, which use the same kind of certificates as bridges. We
use the Network Status Consensuses from CollecTor to classify
IPs as relays. Any IP address that does not correspond to a Tor
relay is a discovered IP address, i.e., running a Tor bridge (or
proxy) at the time of the scan.
Step 3 – Verifying IP addresses. Next, our approach con-
nects to the discovered IP address on the scanned OR port
using the vanilla Tor protocol to try to download a bridge
descriptor. If a descriptor is successfully downloaded, we say
that the IP address is verified, i.e., still running a bridge (or
a proxy). Furthermore, while Tor certificates are so distinct
that we have not observed false positives from the regular
expression used in Step 1, this step guarantees that there are
no false positives since a verified IP address speaks the vanilla
Tor protocol.
Step 4 – Identifying private proxies. To identify private
proxies our approach compares the verified IP address from
where a descriptor was collected in Step 3 with the IP address
that appears in the content of the descriptor. A discrepancy
between both IP addresses indicates that the verified IP address
corresponds to a proxy that forwards traffic to a backend OR,
to whom the descriptor belongs, running on the IP address
leaked inside the descriptor. If no discrepancy is found, the
verified IP address corresponds to a bridge.
Step 5 – Classifying fingerprints. A downloaded descriptor
contains the bridge unsanitized fingerprint, which can be
hashed to obtain the sanitized fingerprint. We then search
the sanitized fingerprint in CollecTor. If found, the descriptor
belongs to a public bridge, otherwise it belongs to a private
bridge. For public bridges, the mapping of an IP address to
a specific bridge (i.e., sanitized fingerprint) provides access to
all its historical data in CollecTor.
Discovery through non-Tor Services. Once a bridge is
identified, it is possible to enumerate other services offered on
the host by performing a vertical scan on its IP address seeking
for open ports. Those additional services may provide unique
identifiers (UIDs) such as SSH keys or TLS certificates that
may enable discovering other bridges from the same owners,
or tracking the bridge across IP changes. The vertical scan can
be replaced by querying for the IP address in Shodan, since it
already scans an IP on over 200 ports with popular protocols.
Once UIDs are available, periodic queries to Shodan using
those UIDs can be used to find new IP addresses where the
UIDs have been observed. Once a candidate IP appears, Steps
2–5 above can be applied. For public bridges the OR port from
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where to try to download the descriptor can be obtained from
CollecTor. For private bridges we first test the OR port of the
bridge from where the UID was original found, in case it has
not changed. Otherwise, Shodan is queried for open ports on
the candidate IP address with a TLS certificate matching the
Tor pattern. If that also fails, a vertical scan can be performed
on the candidate IP (using TLS or the Tor protocol).
Clustering. To better analyze our results, we cluster public
bridges, private bridges, and proxies into groups belonging
to the same organization. Such clustering enables us to study
the characteristics of bridge/proxy infrastructures in use. More
precisely, we cluster tuples of (verifiedIP, port, descriptor)
where verifiedIP and port correspond to the Internet endpoint
from where the descriptor was downloaded. Our clustering
uses 5 Boolean similarity features between tuples:
(1) Same fingerprint. Tuples with descriptors containing the
same fingerprint come from the same bridge, regardless if
collected from different verified IP addresses, and thus are
similar.
(2) Similar nicknames. Nicknames are chosen by the bridge
owner. Hence, we consider similar tuples with descriptors
containing resembling non-generic nicknames. That is, two
tuples are similar if the nicknames are identical and not generic
(“Unnamed”, “default”, “anonymous”, “ididntedittheconfig”,
“ididedittheconfig”), or if they have the same prefix of length
5 or more characters that is not generic (“torat”, “relay”,
“ec2bridger”4), e.g., mybridge3, mybridge4.
(3) Same contact information. The contact information is
a free-text string selected by the bridge owner that often
contains an email address, but may have other content. We
consider similar tuples with descriptors with identical, non-
empty, contact information.
(4) Similar verified IP address. This feature captures that
similarly configured bridges on nearby IP addresses likely
belong to the same owner. Tuples whose verifiedIP is in the
same /24 subnet and for which the descriptors contain identical
values for 5 fields (orport, socksport, dirport, Tor version, OS)
are similar.
(5) Similar IP address in descriptor. Tuples whose IP in the
descriptor is the same or that the IP is in the same /24 subnet
and for which the descriptors contain identical values for 5
fields (orport, socksport, dirport, Tor version, OS) are similar.
Two tuples with at least one of the above features returning
similar are placed in the same cluster. For each cluster,
we obtain statistics such as the number of fingerprints, IP
addresses, private bridges, public bridges, and proxies. We
also compute statistics on the hosting ASes used in the cluster
and study cluster ownership based on the contact information
optionally available in the descriptors of the cluster’s bridges.
V. PUBLIC BRIDGES ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the data published by CollecTor
about public bridges regarding features that may impact the
Tor bridge infrastructure security.
4This generic prefix is due to the now deprecated Tor Cloud image [31].
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Fig. 2. Number of active (bottom bar in green), inactive (top bar in red),
and Ki (middle bar in yellow) sanitized fingerprints over time. The two lines
correspond to the monthly average number of bridges reported by TorMetrics
(black line) and the number of bridges with clients (blue line with circles).
A. Bridge Population
We use CollecTor to compute the number of public bridges
in the Tor Network. We uniquely identify public bridges
and relays by their sanitized fingerprint, assuming that ORs
change fingerprint infrequently (an assumption we validate in
Section VI-A).
We split the sanitized fingerprints in CollecTor into active
if they appear at least once with the Running flag (explained
in Section III-A) in a bridge network status in a month,
and inactive otherwise. Figure 2 shows the evolution over
time of the number of active (green bar) and inactive (red
bar) sanitized fingerprints in the Tor Network. The bridge
population significantly varies over time: it steadily grows from
2.8K active public bridges in July 2012 up to a maximum
of 12.7K in July 2014, and starts declining in January 2015
falling to 5.3K by April 2016. We have had discussions with
members of the Tor project about this recent decline in bridge
population, but the reason remains unclear.
The yellow middle bar represents a cluster of 3 bridges run
by the same organization, that we call by their nickname, Ki,
which change fingerprint up to once an hour (but keep their IP
addresses stable, see Section VI). The Ki cluster produced a
few dozen fingerprints in July 2012, jumped to a few hundreds
in December 2012 and to a few thousands in February 2014.
In March 2016, those 3 bridges are responsible for 32% of all
fingerprints, corresponding to 7% of the active fingerprints and
68% of the inactive fingerprints, as most of their fingerprints
do not live long enough to obtain the Running flag. After
discounting those extraneous fingerprints, the number of active
fingerprints in April 2016 is slightly over 5K.
The figure also shows two lines representing the monthly
average number of bridges reported by TorMetrics [36] (black);
and the number of active bridges with at least one client (blue
with circles). These two values are very close to each other,
though not the same. The blue line represents less than 50%
of the active bridges in a month, indicating that more than
half of the active bridges do not serve users. We examine this
discrepancy in the next subsection.
We use both the number of active bridges (bottom green
bar) and the number of active bridges with at least one client
(blue line) as different baselines for other measurements.
B. Bridge Stability
In this section we use CollecTor to study how stable public
bridges are by first measuring their lifetime (i.e., for how long
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Fig. 3. CDF of bridge lifetime over time (Jul’12 - Apr’16) for all active
bridges (red solid), and bridges that have had at least one client (blue dotted).
they are active) and then how often their IP address changes
over their lifetime.
Bridge Lifetime. We define the lifetime of a bridge as the time
window when the bridge was active, i.e., the time difference, in
days, between the last and first time a descriptor for an active
bridge becomes available in CollecTor. Figure 3 captures the
CDF of the bridges’ lifetime in our study period for all active
bridges (red solid line) and for bridges with clients (blue dotted
line). We see that 67% of the active bridges live for less than
one day, and thus are unlikely to be used by clients. This
explains the difference between the bridges with clients and
the active bridges in Figure 2. However, bridges that are used
by clients are quite stable. Their median lifetime is 116 days
(roughly 4 months) and 25% of them live over one year.
Bridge IP Changes. Next, we evaluate how often public
bridges change IP address. As explained in Section III-A,
bridges’ IP addresses are replaced in CollecTor with its AIP
for privacy reasons. Yet, the AIP construction algorithm, which
every month assigns new AIPs to bridges associated to the
monthly secret, allows to compute the number of IP changes.
It suffices with counting the number of AIPs assigned to a
bridge’s fingerprint and subtract the number of month changes
in its lifetime.
Figure 4 shows the CDF for the number of IP addresses for
all active bridges (blue line with circles) and for bridges with
at least one client (red line with crosses). The figure shows
that 67% of the active bridges have a single stable IP. This
number grows for bridges with clients where 84% of bridges
never change IP address, and 90% had at most one IP address
change.
These results show that 55% of the bridges IPs are short-
lived and thus these bridges do not carry users. On the other
hand, bridges that do carry users are quite stable. They live
for roughly 4 months and 84% of them never change IP
address. These results have important implications for a censor:
they show that current policies that remove blocks for bridge
IP addresses every 25 hours [7] are extremely polite and
adversaries could be performing a more aggressive blocking
(up to months), without the risk of creating too many false
positives.
C. Pluggable Transports Deployment
We now examine PT deployment across time and bridges.
Figure 5 depicts the number of active public bridges, in
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Fig. 5. Number of active fingerprints offering each transport over time (note
the y-axis logarithmic scale).
logarithmic scale, offering each transport over time. It indicates
that the most popular transport is vanilla Tor. Although its
popularity has started to slowly decrease, it is still offered
by 77% of all bridges in April 2016. The timeline shows
how the deployment of obfs4 coincides with the decline of
the deprecated obfs2 [34]. It also shows that after a PT is
introduced, it takes between 4 months and one year to reach
a stable number of 1K–2K bridges offering it. Surprisingly,
deployment of different PTs does not improve beyond that
stability point, an issue that we examine next.
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TABLE I. MOST FREQUENT TRANSPORT COMBINATIONS IN APRIL
2016. COMBINATIONS OFFERED BY A SINGLE BRIDGE OR BY INACTIVE
BRIDGES ARE NOT INCLUDED.
A bridge can offer multiple transports. Table I shows the
most popular transport combinations in April 2016. Rows in
gray highlight that a single transport is offered. Surprisingly,
77% of the bridges only offer vanilla Tor, a transport that is
trivial to identify through traffic analysis. The 1K–2K bridges
offering obfs3, obfs4, and ScrambleSuit (ssuit) responds to the
deployment of multiple transports on the same bridges.
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The combination of PTs with different security properties
raises several security concerns, since the security of the bridge
is only as strong as its weakest link. First, an adversary de-
tecting the weakest transport and blocking the IP disables also
stronger transports for free, e.g., for the nearly 100 bridges that
offer obfs3 or obfs4 in combination with obfs2, which is dep-
recated and trivial to identify through traffic analysis. Second,
it allows an adversary to confirm a bridge, even in presence
of transports that implement reply protection. For example,
for the most popular combination obfs3+obfs4+ScrambleSuit,
offered by 524 bridges, an adversary can confirm a bridge,
e.g., identified through traffic analysis [39], through a vertical
scan using obfs3 on the candidate IP address.
D. OR Port Distribution
In this section we use CollecTor to find the most common
OR ports employed by public bridges. If an adversary knows
that the majority of bridges are running on a few OR ports she
can use them as targets for deanonymization via Internet-wide
scanning, as described in Section IV-B.
First, we study the stability of a bridge’s OR port, i.e., how
often bridges change their OR port. We find that 99% of active
fingerprints never change their OR port during their lifetime.
Next, we study the OR port distribution. During our obser-
vation period, bridges used 7,985 different OR ports. However,
we observe that four ports (443/tcp, 8443/tcp, 444/tcp, and
9001/tcp) are chosen much more often than the rest, while all
other OR ports are used only by a small subset of bridges.
Figure 6 reports the OR port usage over time. The top
line corresponds to the total number of active fingerprints. The
dashed (blue) line directly below corresponds to the top 4 OR
ports aggregated. Each solid line below corresponds to one of
the top 4 OR ports. On average, the top 4 OR ports are used
by 82% of the fingerprints observed each month, although this
fraction has decreased from 95% in March 2013 to 82% in
April 2016. The most common port is 443. We conjecture that
its popularity is due to two main reasons: it is the default
HTTPS (HTTP over TLS) port, which makes it less likely
for TLS-looking vanilla Tor traffic to stand out, and it is a
port typically open in firewalls so it can be reached by most
users. We assume that for similar reasons 8443, the alternative
HTTPS port, is the second most popular port. The third most
popular port, 9001, is the standard Tor port.
Port 444 is a special case since in principle is associated to
the Simple Network Paging Protocol (SNPP), a not so popular
protocol. However, according to CollecTor data, roughly 3K
active fingerprints are using it on April 2016. The reason
for this is that this OR port is used by the Ki bridges that
change fingerprint often, as introduced in Section V-A. Those
Ki bridges artificially inflate the usage of this OR port, a
behavior that does not manifest on other OR ports.
In summary, the OR port distribution shows that an ad-
versary could deanonymize 71% of all active public bridges
by scanning 3 OR ports (443, 8443, 9001) and 82% if we
consider the Top 4 with the anomalous 444. While 443 usage
has declined over time, the top 4 OR ports usage closely
follows the total active bridges, thus OR port diversity does
not seem to be improving over time.
After we reported our findings to the Tor project, they
opened a ticket to sanitize the OR port in CollecTor [16] so
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Fig. 6. Top 4 OR ports used by active public bridges over time. The top dotted
line represents all active public bridges; the dashed line below corresponds the
Top-4 OR ports together; and each solid line represents one OR port.
CC Used Top 20 Total
Brid. Clients (Default) Default
cn 712 4,265 45.6% (44.0%) [14] 44.3% [18]
ir 941 26,479 86.6% (86.1%) [16] 86.1% [18]
sy 74 449 76.9% (68.0%) [14] 69.2% [17]
uk 943 16,723 84.1% (84.0%) [17] 84.0% [19]
us 1,496 17,911 58.7% (56.7%) [ 6] 56.9% [11]
All 2,213 301,009 91.71% (91.4%) [17] 91.4% [23]
TABLE II. BRIDGE IMPORTANCE PER COUNTRY (APR’16)
that our experiments cannot be replicated.
E. Bridge Importance
As introduced in Section III-A, not all bridges are equally
important and CollecTor can be used to rank bridges according
to different metrics. We now evaluate two example scenarios:
ranking bridges by country usage and by PT usage. These two
rankings are very relevant to, for instance, a censor that wants
to know how many (or which) bridges have to be blocked
to minimize the likelihood of users connecting outside the
country; or to block a strong PT that it cannot be identified
through traffic analysis or active probing. For our evaluation
we select 5 countries: three where Internet censorship is known
to occur [9]: China (cn), Iran (ir) and Syria (sy); and two where
monitoring is a real threat: United Kingdom (uk) and United
States (us) [12], [23].
Ranking per Country. Table II summarizes the ranking
per country for April 2016. For each country it shows the
country code, the number of bridges that received at least
one connection from users located inside the country, the
average number of clients per day served by those bridges,
the percentage of these clients served by the Top 20 bridges,
with the fraction served by default bridges5 in parentheses,
and the total traffic carried by default bridges. For the last
two columns the number of default bridges is shown in square
brackets. The All row at the bottom corresponds to statistics
for all bridges in CollecTor regardless of user location.
The Top 20 bridge statistics show that a few bridges handle
the majority of clients. The Top 20 support more than 91% of
traffic for the full Tor Network, and more than 75% for all
countries except China and the US, where clients are better
spread among available bridges. The Top 20 is dominated by
default bridges. In fact, the Top 14 bridges in the full Tor
Network, and also in all countries except the US, are default
5We use the default bridges available in the Tor Browser 5.5.5 distribution.
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PT Used Top 20 Total
Brid. Clients (Default) Default
vanilla 1,967 14,939 5.6% ( 0.0%) [ 0] 1.2% [21]
obfs2 13 158 100.0% (25.8%) [ 1] 25.8% [ 1]
obfs3 898 63,088 92.0% (90.8%) [ 4] 90.8% [ 4]
obfs4 792 204,095 95.4% (94.7%) [11] 94.7% [11]
ssuit 467 4,483 52.4% (46.3%) [ 1] 46.3% [ 1]
meek 4 22,685 100.0% (∼100%) [ 3] ∼100% [ 3]
TABLE III. BRIDGE IMPORTANCE PER PT (APR’16).
bridges. Thus, we can conclude that default bridges carry the
vast majority of clients in the Tor Network.
This dominant choice of default bridges, which are trivial to
deanonymize through the configuration files shipped in the Tor
Browser Bundle, means that in the majority of cases clients
route their traffic through known bridges, thus defeating the
very purpose of bridges.
Ranking per PT. Table III summarizes the ranking per PT
for April 2016. Its structure is the same as that for Table II.
The results indicate that while vanilla Tor is the most widely
deployed transport, most clients opt for more recent PTs such
as obfs4, obfs3, and meek. ScrambleSuit (ssuit) is not very
popular and, as expected [34], obfs2 has almost completely
stopped being used.
We observe that the Top 20 bridges handle almost the entire
user base for obfs4, obfs3, and meek. The vast majority (90%–
100%) of clients using these 3 transports are carried by default
bridges. The Top 20 bridges do not dominate vanilla Tor and
ScrambleSuit, likely related to no default bridge being marked
as offering vanilla Tor in the Tor client configuration files and
only one offering ScrambleSuit. Still, the lone default bridge
offering ScrambleSuit carries over 46% of the clients using
that transport.
OR Port Distribution per Country. In Section V-D we have
studied the global ranking of OR ports and have shown that the
top 3 OR ports are used by 71% of all public bridges. Here,
we analyze whether the top bridges by number of clients also
follow that distribution.
Table IV contains the Top 20 OR ports by percentage of
clients served in the full Tor Network. For each OR port it
reports the rank, the percentage of clients supported by bridges
using that OR port, the number of bridges using that OR port
(and how many are default bridges in square brackets), and
the ranking of the OR port when only considering connections
from a particular country.
The table shows that the choice of OR port among popular
bridges does not resemble the distribution of OR ports in the
overall bridge population. The Top 6 OR ports correspond
exclusively to default bridges. The first OR ports in the Top 10
global distribution appear at rank 8 (9002) and rank 10 (9001).
In both cases, the majority of the clients served on those ports
correspond to default bridges, e.g., for port 9001 the percentage
of clients served by the 303 non-default bridges is negligible.
From that point, we see that the most popular bridges run in
random high ports. These results suggest that owners of non-
default popular bridges are careful to set the OR port selection
to random, but those of less popular bridges are not as careful
in this respect.
RK Port Clients BRs Ranking per Country
( % ) [Default] cn ir sy uk us
1 6666 23.805% 1 [1] 2 5 6 1 1
2 42506 14.096% 1 [1] 6 3 4 3 -
3 60906 13.877% 1 [1] 7 4 3 2 -
4 63848 13.730% 2 [2] 5 6 5 4 4
5 44445 9.485% 1 [1] 8 2 2 5 2
6 8008 7.173% 1 [1] 4 54 - 6 -
7 29001 5.027% 2 [1] 10 1 1 7 3
8 9002 2.827% 2 [1] 1 7 8 8 -
9 1512 1.206% 1 [1] 3 8 14 9 125
10 9001 0.263% 309 [6] 19 9 7 10 5
11 29309 0.045% 1 [0] 36 10 - 42 10
12 27134 0.041% 1 [0] 15 13 18 12 16
13 20506 0.040% 1 [0] 59 19 19 11 7
14 12497 0.040% 1 [0] 57 14 - 42 9
15 59760 0.039% 1 [0] 18 19 - 33 11
16 60841 0.039% 1 [0] 49 15 - 50 16
17 53885 0.038% 1 [0] 15 36 - 50 14
18 14769 0.035% 1 [0] 38 61 - 11 6
19 34678 0.033% 1 [0] 37 12 - 66 8
20 19924 0.032% 1 [0] 12 19 - 19 14
TABLE IV. OR PORT RANKING FOR MOST USED BRIDGES (APR’16).
The ranking per country shows that, even though in general
default bridges dominate in all countries, the popular non-
default bridges can significantly vary across countries. For
example, in Syria the globally popular bridges have little
overlap with the popular ones in that country. This suggests
that a state-level adversary can use CollecTor to compute a
ranking of, currently unblocked, OR ports that she should
target next through Internet-wide scanning to maximize the
blocked population in her country.
Another observation (not shown in Table IV) is that all
Top 20 non-default bridges incur in the problem flagged in
Section V-C of offering multiple PTs with different security
properties.
VI. PRIVATE BRIDGES AND PROXIES ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze private bridges and proxies in
the Tor Network. Section VI-A presents the results of applying
the bridge discovery approach described in Section IV-B on
the Tor Network during April 2016. Then, in Section VI-B we
analyze the discovered bridge/proxy infrastructures.
A. Discovering Private Bridges & Proxies
Since we do not run our own scans, we can only apply the
bridge discovery to 7 out of the top 10 OR ports, which are
scanned by either Censys or Shodan using TLS in April 2016.
Table V summarizes our results. For each OR port we report:
the number of scans available on that port in April 2016, the
source of the scanning data (either Censys or Shodan), the
first and last scan dates, the date when verification started,
the number of discovered bridge IP addresses, i.e., those
where scan data shows a certificate matching the Tor pattern
and that are not relays, the number of verified IP addresses
(and fingerprints in parentheses) from which we were able to
download a bridge descriptor, and the split of verified IPs (and
fingerprints) into public bridges, private bridges, and private
proxies. Note that we distinguish public and private bridges
through fingerprints, but proxies by IP address, as proxies are
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Port Scans Source Scan Dates Verif. Date Disc. Verified Public Private Proxy
443 9 Censys 04/04–04/28 04/08 2,448 1,315 (1,122) 897 (860) 263 (262) 164
993 2 Censys 04/20–04/27 04/21 19 16 (13) 11 (11) 3 (2) 2
995 3 Censys 04/15–04/29 04/23 14 14 (13) 10 (10) 3 (3) 1
444 1 Shodan 04/19–04/19 04/19 14 12 (101) 8 (97) 1 (4) 4
8443 1 Shodan 04/21–04/21 04/22 191 156 (149) 148 (148) 1 (1) 7
9001 1 Shodan 04/17–04/17 04/18 2,001 1047 (587) 165 (166) 415 (421) 468
9002 1 Shodan 04/23–04/23 04/23 23 19 (5) 1 (1) 4 (4) 14
All 17 All 04/04–04/29 04/08 4,684 2,554 (1,986) 1,239 (1,292) 684 (694) 645
TABLE V. BRIDGE DISCOVERY IN APRIL 2016
not Tor ORs and have no fingerprint. The last row shows the
aggregate results for all ports.
Overall, we discover 694 private bridges and 645 private
proxies, which do not appear in CollecTor. Additionally, we
deanonymize the IP address of 1,292 public bridges. According
to CollecTor data, these correspond to 35% of public bridges
with clients (23% of all active public bridges) in April 2016,
excluding Ki bridges. On the 7 OR ports examined, the bridge
population comprises 65% public and 35% private bridges, i.e.,
one in three bridges is private.
There exist several reasons why we do not deanonymize
a larger fraction of public bridges in CollecTor. First, we
can only deanonymize bridges on the 7 OR ports scanned
by Censys or Shodan. Second, for most ports we only have
one scan in the second half of the month. Hence, we cannot
discover short-lived bridges active only in the first half of the
month. Furthermore, we have shown that 55% of active bridges
are short-lived; thus, while they may appear as candidate IPs,
we may not be able to confirm them because they no longer
live when we try to download a descriptor from them.
We note that the aggregated results differ slightly from the
sum of all rows for two reasons. First, a few proxies have more
than one OR port open and thus their IPs are counted in more
than one row. In addition, a few IP addresses were observed
hosting a proxy at some point in the month and hosting a
bridge at other times. Also, note that the number of verified
fingerprints for port 444 is significantly larger than the number
of verified IPs. This is because 6 of these IPs (3 proxies and 3
public bridges) belong to the Ki cluster that changes fingerprint
periodically.
Discovery through non-Tor Services. Next, we evaluate if
additional services running on bridge hosts can be leveraged to
track bridges across IP address changes. For this, we assume
an adversary discovered a bridge by any means, (e.g., the
approach in Section VI-B, querying BridgeDB, or adding a
middle OR in the Tor Network [15]), but the open OR port
issue we leverage has been solved by the Tor project.
First, we measure the percentage of bridges in Table V
with additional ports open (beyond the OR port). For this, we
query each verified IP address at Shodan. Overall, 621 (24%)
of the 2,554 verified IPs offer at least one additional service
(beyond the OR port) and 10% more than one. In total, we
observe 101 additional ports. These numbers indicate that it is
not uncommon to run other services on a Tor bridge. The most
common additional services are SSH on ports 22 and 2222,
Web services on ports 80 and 443, and RPC port mapper on
111. As unique identifiers (UIDs), we use SSH keys on ports
22 and 2222 and certificate serial numbers on 443.
Scanning those UIDs in Shodan on May 18 provides us
with 2,248 candidate IPs, of which only 248 return a descriptor.
After filtering out relays and already known IPs, we found 9
new bridge IP addresses that were not observed in April 2016.
For example, one is located in Amazon EC2 and corresponds
to a bridge that was running on another IP in April 2016, but
likely changed IP because the EC2 instance was restarted, as
EC2 assigns VM IP addresses from a shared pool.
Fingerprint Stability Validation. The discovery of bridges,
which provides us with access to their unsanitized descriptors,
allows us to validate the assumption that OR fingerprints
rarely change, and thus are indeed good bridge identifiers. We
periodically (roughly once a day until June 3rd, 2016) try to
download a descriptor from verified IP addresses. Then, we
measure the frequency of fingerprint changes in the descriptors
for bridge (i.e., non-proxy) IPs found in April 2016.
Overall, 94.1% of the bridge IP addresses did not change
fingerprint, 5.5% changed fingerprint once, and 0.4% changed
fingerprint multiple times. The bridges with multiple fin-
gerprint changes include the 3 Ki bridges, which present a
different fingerprint every time we connect to them (on a closer
look we find that they change fingerprint roughly every hour).
Furthermore, we observe that over 70% of the IP addresses
with fingerprint changes belong to 2 clusters of private bridges
each using multiple nearby IP addresses. These IPs change
fingerprint on the same dates, so it is possible that bridges in
each cluster were reassigned IP addresses on those dates.
These numbers confirm that the vast majority of bridges do
not change fingerprint over time. Thus, bridge fingerprints (and
sanitized fingerprints in CollecTor) can be used as identifiers.
Hosting. The discovered proxies are hosted in 166 ASes, the
private bridges in 139, and the public bridges in 385. The top
10 ASes for both bridges and proxies are dominated by the
ASes used by the top clusters we find in the next Section. For
bridges, the top 10 ASes comprise: 5 popular cloud hosting
providers, 2 broadband residential ISPs, and 3 large ISPs that
provide multiple services. While overall there seems to be
enough IP diversity among the bridge population, in the next
section we show that individual clusters exhibit less diversity.
Contact Information. Bridge descriptors may contain contact
information that could reveal ownership. We find 267 email
addresses in the descriptors collected from the 1,986 public
and private bridges. Of those, 69 have a domain name from
a public email service provider (e.g., Gmail, Yahoo), and thus
cannot be easily used to establish ownership. The other 198
email addresses contain 191 domain names, of which 175
return a valid mail server IP address through a DNS MX
query, the rest we discard as invalid. Those 175 domains appear
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Fig. 7. The three most common cluster types.
in descriptors from 307 bridges: 187 public and 120 private.
This indicates that, contrary to what could be expected, private
bridges often provide contact information that may reveal the
organizations behind the bridge. This enables an adversary to
identify Tor clients connecting to the bridge as members of
that organization.
B. Bridge/Proxy Infrastructures
We cluster bridges and proxies as described in Section IV-B
to better understand how they are used. Out of 41,359 tuples
(verifiedIP, port, descriptor), collected by connecting period-
ically to the 2,554 verified IP addresses, we obtain 1,343
clusters, of which 75% are singletons, i.e., contain a single
bridge and no proxies.
We identify 5 cluster types, as well as mixed clusters with
subclusters of those types. The 3 most common cluster types
are shown in Figure 7. Type I corresponds to a line of proxies
(from 2 up to 178) that all forward to the same backend. Type
II is a Type I cluster with a single proxy. For both types, the
backend can be a private bridge, a public bridge, or a relay.
Type III is a cluster of multiple bridges belonging to the same
owner, without proxies. Type III clusters can have only public
bridges or only private bridges.
Not shown in Figure 7 are the rarer Type IV and Type V.
Type IV corresponds to the same bridge running on multiple
IPs at the same point in time. This differs from a bridge
changing IP over time where we would observe the same
fingerprint at different IPs on different days. This cluster
type could be a result of cloning an image with an installed
bridge on multiple VMs. Type V corresponds to a proxy load-
balancing across multiple backend IPs. In most cases, the
backend IPs host the same bridge (fingerprint), which runs
on a Windows host. This is similar to a fast-flux network
where residential hosts run bridges, and the proxy provides
IP stability to access them.
We develop a set of rules to automatically classify non-
singleton clusters. The cluster classification outputs: 47 clusters
as Type I (37 relay, 7 public, 3 private); 138 as Type II (94
relay, 29 public, 15 private); 88 as Type III (69 public, 19
private); 43 as Type IV; 10 as Type V; and 16 as mixed clusters
containing at least two subclusters of other types.
Type I clusters most often have proxies forwarding to a
IPs Bridges
# Type All Proxy Pub. Priv. ASNs Contact
1 I public 179 178 1 0 1,1,7 X
2 III private 164 0 0 164 0,1,7 X
3 I relay 72 71 0 0 1,1,X -
4 III private 63 0 0 63 0,1,7 -
5 III public 53 0 53 0 0,16,7 X
TABLE VI. STATISTICS ON TOP 5 CLUSTERS.
relay (37 clusters) or a public bridge (7 clusters). A similar
trend applies to Type II clusters. In all Type I clusters all
proxies in the cluster are hosted in the same AS, and are often
located in nearby and even consecutive IP addresses. In 77%
of Type I and Type II clusters, the proxies and the backend
are in the same AS. The cases where proxies and backends are
in different ASes could indicate organizations free-riding on
public ORs to perhaps avoid configuring their own bridge. We
observe only 3 Type I clusters with private backend indicating
that, since proxy IPs are already private, there is no benefit on
a private backend.
In Type I and Type II clusters, proxies seem to be used by
owners of public bridges and relays to keep a few IPs (only
one for Type II) private for their own use. Those proxies do
not provide much IP diversity; once a proxy is known, an
adversary could scan the nearby IP addresses to find other
proxies and the backend. Furthermore, when the backend is a
relay, an adversary could scan IP ranges hosting relays to try
to find proxies forwarding to it. It is also important to note
that when the backend is a relay only vanilla Tor is supported,
as relays do not run PTs.
Type III clusters most often comprise public bridges (69
clusters) but can also have private bridges (19 clusters). In
93% of Type III clusters all bridges are in the same AS. This
indicates that once an owner has established a relationship with
a hosting provider, it is easier to install multiple bridges on
that provider. Still, there are a few Type III clusters with good
diversity. For example, the cluster at Rank 5 has 53 public
bridges on 16 ASes. We observe that some Type III public
clusters belong to organizations that also contribute relays to
the Tor Network. Another public cluster belongs to a computer
security company.
The mixed clusters show that our clustering can capture
multiple infrastructures from the same owner. An example of
a mixed cluster is the Ki cluster, which comprises a Type
I subcluster with 2 proxies forwarding to a public bridge,
another Type II subcluster with one proxy forwarding to one
public bridge, and a singleton subcluster with a public bridge.
Both bridges and proxies in the cluster keep their IP address
stable, but bridges change fingerprint hourly.
We conclude that proxies are not generally used for load-
balancing across multiple backend ORs as there are only 10
Type V clusters compared to 185 Type I and Type II clusters.
Proxies do not seem to be used for OR port diversity either.
We observe only 13 proxy IPs forwarding on multiple ports.
Of those, 10 belong to 2 clusters where the same backend IP
runs two different bridges on different ports and a proxy port
forwards always to the same backend OR port.
Top Clusters. Table VI provides details for the Top 5 clusters.
For each cluster, it shows the rank by number of IP addresses;
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the type; the total number of IP addresses; the number of proxy
IP addresses; the number of public and private bridges (by
fingerprint); the hosting as a (x,y,flag) tuple with number of
autonomous system numbers (ASNs) for proxy IPs (x), bridge
IPs (y), and whether those ASNs are the same (X) or not (7);
and if the bridges in the cluster contain contact information.
VII. SECURITY DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
In this section we recapitulate the findings described
throughout the paper and discuss their implication with respect
to the security and privacy of Tor’s bridge population.
A. Security Implications of Scan Search Engines
While the use of Internet-wide scanning for discovering
bridges was known [4], [38], our work illustrates how the
availability of scan search engines, which index data collected
from Internet-wide scans, greatly lowers the attack cost in
terms of scanning infrastructure. Thus, the security of systems
that require hiding components, e.g., Tor bridges, should be
designed with this threat in mind.
By leveraging search engines, an adversary that follows
our approach can discover, with no investment in scanning
infrastructure, 35% of public bridges with clients, 23% of
active public bridges, and hundreds of private bridges and
proxies. The discovered public bridges support 95% of all
clients and include 90% of the bridges offering obfs4 and
obfs3. In contrast, other bridge enumeration attacks, e.g., using
a middle node or performing clever queries to the Bridge
Authority [15], achieve lower coverage, are much slower, and
may require setting up an OR. Furthermore, we have shown
a novel technique to leverage scan search engines to discover
Tor bridges by examining non-Tor services running on bridge
hosts. Those services may provide unique identifiers (e.g., SSH
keys) that may reveal other bridges from the same owners and
enable tracking a bridge across IP changes.
From the perspective of resource usage, our whole process-
ing runs on a single host, with no demanding requirements in
terms of CPU and memory. The main bottleneck is the time
needed to download the Censys scan, which typically exceeds
100 GB and takes around 24 hours. The reason we download
the raw scan data, rather than querying Censys directly, is that
the Censys administrators seem to be filtering Tor certificates
from the indexed (but not the raw) data. Downloading the
smaller CollecTor files can be done in parallel with the Censys
download. Beyond the data download, it takes 8-12 hours to
process the Censys data, query Shodan, and connect to each
discovered IP using vanilla Tor. Thus, our processing currently
incurs a delay of one and a half days between a bridge is
scanned and we connect to it.
We note that current Internet-wide scanning approaches
focus on IPv4 addresses. Bridges running exclusively on IPv6
addresses are difficult to identify through such scanning due
to limited scan coverage. While such bridges can only be
accessed by clients supporting IPv6, recent OSes support IPv6
off-the-shelf. Thus, a possible defense against our techniques
is to transition a fraction of bridges to IPv6.
Closing the OR Port. Having the OR port open in all bridges
enables bridge enumeration through Internet-wide scanning.
Closing the OR port has been queued for fixing since Novem-
ber 2012. While its priority was increased in September
2015 [29], the fix has not happened yet, as it requires changes
to the Bridge Authority, BridgeDB, and multiple other tools
that assume bridges have an OR port. Our quantification of the
impact of this bug highlights the importance of quickly fixing
vulnerabilities. We hope our work will provide a push to fix
this bug and possibly to find an entity that sponsors the fix.
While the bug is fixed, possible stopgap fixes include
allowing only known IPs (e.g., Bridge Authority) to connect
to the OR port and improving OR port diversity. The latter
is critical because closing the OR port by default does not
solve the problem that it would remain open for the 77%
bridges offering vanilla Tor, which would still be vulnerable to
scanning attacks. Non-default important bridges, i.e., carrying
a significant number of users, seem to already be randomizing
the OR port by setting it to auto in their configuration, likely
due to the expertise of their owners. This forces an attacker
to scan many ports before finding a significant fraction of
bridges. However, we have shown that 71% of public bridges
use 3 OR ports. Thus, it is critical to educate less expert users
on the importance of setting the OR port to auto in their
bridge configuration. Bridge configuration tutorials that still
use a fixed OR port, e.g. [27], should be fixed.
We must stress that closing the OR port does not eliminate
the threat of discovering bridges through additional non-Tor
services coexisting on a bridge’s host, nor other security risks
uncovered by our analysis that we discuss in the following
sections.
B. Security Implications of CollecTor Data
While collecting fine-grained data about the Tor Network is
fundamental for the Tor project maintainers, making it publicly
available through services like CollecTor requires an analysis
of the benefit versus privacy trade-off to understand the risks.
One of our goals was analyzing if the fine-grained, per-bridge,
data provided by CollecTor, as opposed to aggregate statistics
provided by Tor Metrics, could be harmful to the security of
public bridges. Here we discuss our findings.
OR Ports. The most concerning data in CollecTor we found is
the availability of OR ports. Knowing the OR port of all public
bridges helps to optimize the discovery of bridges by focusing
Internet-wide scans on the most popular OR ports, which are
used by the overwhelming majority of bridges. Furthermore, as
discussed in Section V-E, an adversary can search for the OR
port of a bridge of interest (e.g., one supporting most users in
a censored country or providing strong PTs) and then perform
an Internet-wide scan on that OR port to deanonymize it. After
we sent a draft of this work to the Tor project, CollecTor
has started sanitizing the OR port in a similar way as they
anonymize bridge IPs [16]. Such sanitization prevents mapping
an anonymized OR port in CollecTor to a real port, preventing
the two issues above.
Fingerprints. A second piece of data extremely valuable for
our work was the availability of the bridge sanitized finger-
print. It allowed us to link information from different CollecTor
files and gather longitudinal information on individual bridges.
Having a unique bridge identifier is fundamental to the granu-
larity of CollecTor. Thus, it does not seem easy to remove them
and instead raises the question of whether CollecTor should be
a service only available to Tor maintainers. Another issue is
that once the fingerprint of a public bridge is known, it can
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be hashed to find the specific bridge in CollecTor enabling
near-real-time access to bridge’s data (e.g., PTs offered, IP
changes), as well as longitudinal statistics on the whole bridge
lifetime. This could be addressed by adding a secret to the
fingerprint sanitization. However, this would prevent bridge
owners to check CollecTor statistics on their own bridges.
Usage Statistics. Rounding usage counters is a simple method
to protect individual users while enabling statistics collec-
tion. Recent developments on privacy-preserving collection
of statistics [6], [13] improve this protection and enable a
wider range of statistics collection. Yet, these methods are
not sufficient to prevent an adversary from ranking bridges
according to their usage. We have shown that such rankings
have two security implications. First, they enable an adversary
to evaluate how successful is her blocking, not only at the
global Tor Network level, but more worryingly for specific
countries and PTs. Second, they allow an adversary to identify
valuable (yet unblocked) bridges to target. Therefore, we
believe that further research on privacy-preserving publishing
of aggregated statistics is needed.
C. Security Implications of Bridge Properties
In this Section we discuss implications of the bridge
properties we learned through the analysis of CollecTor data.
Bridge Stability. We found that public bridges can be coarsely
classified in 55% volatile and 45% stable, where only stable
bridges carry client traffic. Volatile bridges are short-lived
and may be due to bridges installed on machines not always
connected to the Internet, or by users testing how to run a
bridge. Stable bridges are long-lived (median lifetime of 4
months) and rarely change IP address. Stability means once a
user obtains the bridge information from BridgeDB it can use it
for a long time. On the other hand, it also implies that current
adversary blocking policies, e.g., the GFC removing blocks
for bridge IP addresses every 25 hours [7], are extremely
polite. Once an adversary finds a stable bridge, it can perform
more aggressive blocking (up to months) or adaptive, by
reconnecting to a bridge every day to check it is still active
and the block should be renewed.
Use of Default Bridges. Our study of bridge importance
reveals that default bridges carry over 90% of bridge users.
Default bridges enable out-of-the-box use of Tor software,
without the need to request bridges from BridgeDB. While
censors may not be continuously blocking default bridges
(otherwise they would not carry clients on censored countries),
their massive usage enables easy disconnection of the bridges
user base in response to events. Our measurements show that
such blocking would disconnect nearly 90% of bridge clients
in countries like Iran and Syria. Additionally, the fact that Tor
users are educated to use the software out-of-the-box casts
doubts about their ability to find alternative bridges when such
blocking happens.
PT Deployment. We observe that 77% of public bridges only
offer vanilla Tor and another 15% mix PTs with conflicting
security properties (e.g., with and without reply protection),
reducing the protection to that of the least safe transport. In
general, the goal should be that bridges do not offer weak
transports (e.g., vanilla) or deprecated ones (e.g., obfs2), but
only PTs considered safe and without conflicting properties.
The current PT deployment strategy in which bridge owners
decide independently which PTs to offer from the complete
pool of PTs is not optimal. There is a need for a faster way
to remove PTs known to be unsafe (e.g., vanilla, obfs2). This
could be achieved by adding automatic updates to Tor, enabling
centralized decision on which PTs should no longer be offered
and faster distribution of updates to disable them. In general,
automatic updates would more quickly close the vulnerability
window for any already fixed security issue. Since adding
automatic updates may take time, the Tor software could in
the mean time be configured to offer the strongest PT (e.g.,
obfs4) by default and to warn the user if two transports with
conflicting security properties are about to be offered.
D. Security Implications of Uncovering Private Infrastructure
Discovery of private bridges and proxies is arguably more
worrisome than deanonymization of the IP address of public
bridges. Their discovery allows an adversary to learn that IP
addresses connecting to them correspond to Tor users that are
members of the owner organization, and to use their IPs to
geographically locate the users. This is particularly dangerous
as private bridges and proxies may be run precisely by or-
ganizations trying to avoid such identification. One positive
aspect is that since private bridges do not report to the Bridge
Authority, nor are explored by any Tor-related service, it may
be much easier to disable their OR port. This would prevent
private bridges from appearing in scan search engines, and if
they exclusively use strong PTs (e.g., obfs4), would thwart
attempts of scanning to find them.
We have uncovered that multiple organizations are using
private proxies as cheap replacements for private bridges.
However, proxies are always in the same AS, which in 77%
type I and II clusters is also the same AS hosting the backend
OR. Once a proxy is discovered, it is possible to scan nearby
IP addresses to find other proxies and the backend. In the case
of backend relays, whose IP addresses are known, an adversary
can perform localized scans around relay IP addresses to locate
proxies. In those cases, using as backend a public bridge with
a random OR port is preferable to a relay.
Proxies also have non-security implications for the Tor
Network. First, they add an extra hop in addition to the 3-
hop Tor circuit, which if the proxy lays across the Internet
from the bridge increases the, already high, latency of Tor
circuits. Second, proxies affect the usage statistics in CollecTor
as connections from multiple clients, potentially in different
countries, are all counted as connections from the proxy IP
address by the backend OR.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The academic community has paid quite some attention to
Tor bridges A first line of research related to this work deals
with the proposal of PTs to avoid traffic analysis attacks [5],
[21], [40], [45], and their detection [39]. The latter work stud-
ies the detectability of five popular PTs. Their results show that
a determined adversary can reliably detect communications
with bridges with a low false positive rate.
A second line of work arises in response to censors using
active probing to confirm that suspicious nodes are bridges [7].
This work also shows that the censors’ systems operate in
real time, are able to detect servers using five circumvention
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protocols and are regularly updated. Houmansadr et al. [10]
show that PTs that mimic other protocols, e.g., [21], [40], are
particularly sensitive to active probing since they only mimic
part of the communication. Defenses against active probing are
based on PTs that only reply upon being proven that the client
knows a long-lived secret [1], [45] or a short-lived key [24].
A third relevant research line is dedicated to the discovery
of bridges. McLachlan and Hopper [20] showed that it is
possible to deanonymize bridge operators when bridges run
in clients. In case bridges are dedicated servers, Ling et
al [15] provide both active attacks where the adversary di-
rectly interacts with the bridge distributor, and passive attacks
where she sets up a relay and enumerates bridges (i.e., non
relay nodes) that connect to it. The work on Internet-wide
scanning by Durumeric et al. [4] showed that the pattern in
Tor certificates could be used to identify bridges, a property
that we leverage to realize our measurement of the Tor bridge
infrastructure. We show how to optimize enumeration by
leveraging data in CollecTor and the availability of scan search
engines to minimize investment in scanning infrastructure. We
also present an alternative discovery technique based on non-
Tor services bridges may also run, which is related to works
leveraging leaks on scan search repositories to deanonymize
hidden services [19].
A fourth research line proposes defenses based on decoy
routing, where modified routers can be signaled to act as cir-
cumvention proxies [11], [14], [22]. These solutions increase
the cost of blocking at the expense of modifying the routing
infrastructure, an orthogonal problem to the one in this paper
where we study the security of currently deployed defenses.
Finally, Winter et al. [43] propose a tool to identify sybils
in the Tor Network, i.e., relays owned by the same group, by
studying configuration and uptime similarity. Our clustering
has a similar goal as their nearest neighbor ranking and can
be applied to relay descriptors as well, with the advantage that
it does not require an input OR to compare with.
IX. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our measurements only leverage known limitations of
the Tor Network, and only use leaks present in publicly
accessible repositories such as Shodan, Censys or CollecTor.
We purposefully avoid adding relays or bridges into the Tor
Network, as well as exploiting any software vulnerability. We
have no access to any traffic that is not ours, and hence we
can not threaten the privacy of any Tor user. However, the data
we collect contains the IP addresses and contact information
of public and private bridges that must be kept private to
preserve the security provided by the Tor Network. Thus, we
do not disclose any bridge/proxy IP addresses, nor any personal
information we may learn about its owners, but only provide
aggregate data to illustrate important steps and findings.
This work has been approved by ethics review board of
our institution, which has mandated that due to its sensitive
nature the data must be protected with diligence, must not be
disclosed to third parties, and must be deleted when the paper
is published. We sent a copy of the submitted draft to the Tor
project. They have already started taking measures [16] to pre-
vent bridge targeting based on CollecTor public information.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work we provide the first systematic security
analysis of the Tor bridge infrastructure. Our opportunistic
measurements, made possible by taking advantage of two
known Tor issues, allow us to discover thousands of bridges
which we have used to gain understanding about the security
properties of the bridge population. In particular we uncover
the use of private proxy-based infrastructures likely to obtain
IP diversity to access the Tor Network. We also study the
impact on security of publicly available information such as
that provided by CollecTor or scan search engines. Our results
have implications for the Tor project, since they indicate that
the two issues we leveraged need to be solved as soon as
possible, and that the information offered by CollecTor may
need to be reduced; but also beyond, since we confirm that
the information made available by public scan search engines
should be taken into account when designing covert services.
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